Appendix: Electoral Colorism

A Descriptive Representation in Ecuador

Figure A.1: Number of Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Politicians Elected Over Time



Note: Figure A.1 shows the number of Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian politicians elected over time.

B Descriptive Statistics

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Relative List Position	2,088	50	37.115	0	100
List Length	2,088	5.521	3.647	2	15
Candidate Skin Color (Average)	2,088	3.715	1.176	1	9
Candidate Skin Color (Median)	2,088	3.735	1.126	1	9
Woman Candidate	2,088	0.474	0.499	0	1
Incumbent	2,088	0.016	0.127	0	1
College Degree	2,088	0.606	0.489	0	1
Candidate Age	2,088	41.903	12.959	18.475	78.642
Elected 2021	2,088	0.063	0.243	0	1
Left Party	2,009	0.430	0.495	0	1
Center Party	2,009	0.361	0.481	0	1
Right Party	2,009	0.209	0.406	0	1

Note: Table B.1 provides descriptive information about the variables employed.

Figure B.1: Histogram of Ecuadorian Population Skin Color Values



Note: Figure B.1 shows the skin color scores of the Ecuadorian population according to data from the 2019 America's Barometer. The skin color measure is rounded to the nearest integer for display purposes.

Figure B.2: Histogram of Ecuadorian Male Candidate Skin Color Values



Note: Figure B.2 shows the skin color scores of Ecuadorian male candidates. The skin color measure is rounded to the nearest integer for display purposes.

Figure B.3: Histogram of Ecuadorian Female Candidate Skin Color Values



Note: Figure B.3 shows the skin color scores of Ecuadorian female candidates. The skin color measure is rounded to the nearest integer for display purposes.

C Party Categorization

Table C.1: Political Party Ideology Classification

Left	Center	Right
Act to Transform Bolivar	12-51 Alliance	CREO
Advancing in Union for Cotopaxi	Concertacion	CREO–ADE
ARE	Democratic Left	CREO–MAS
Avanza	Ecuadorian Union	CREO–SIARI
Azuay First	Fuerza Ecuador	Chimborazo First
Building Democracy Alliance	Magical Productive Napo	Dignity for Chimborazo
Coalition of the Commons	PAIS Alliance	MACHETE
Democratic Center	PSP	MSC–PSC
Dignity for Zamora Chinchipe	PSP–Ahora	PSC
Honesty Alliance	Renovation Movement	PSC–MCMG
Loja First	Together We Can	PSC–TC
MC25	United Ecuadorian	People's Alliance
MC25–PAIS Alliance	United for the Future	Social Justice
MINGA		SUMA
Minka for Life		SUMA–PSC
OPCION		SUMA–Venceremos
Orellana Strength		Unite–Rebirth–PSC
PSE		United Manabí
Pachakutik		United for Pastazan Progress
Pastaza of Heart		
Sucumbios DNA		
Sumak Yuyuy		
UNES		
UP		
UP–Pachakutik		
United Minga for Life		
United in Solidarity		
Yes Democracy		

Note: Table C.1 indicates how Ecuadorian political parties were classified.

Table C.2: Political Parties

Uncategorized Political Parties	APLA, Amazonian Strength, Believing in Our People, Carchi Leads, Citizen's Accord Movement, Citizen's Fight Front, MAR, MC, New Generation, People's Movement, Positive, Provincial "Change" Movement, Provincial Identity Movement, Regional United South Movement, SIII, Solidarity, United Tungurahua, We Are Free, Yes We Can

Note: Table C.2 indicates which Ecuadorian political parties it was not possible to categorize as left, center or right.

D Robustness Checks

Table D.1: First Position Regression Results

	Dependent variable:	
	First Position on the Party List	
	(1)	(2)
Candidate Skin Color	-0.050***	-0.052***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Incumbent		0.586***
		(0.087)
College Degree		0.134***
		(0.023)
Woman Candidate		-0.132***
		(0.020)
Candidate Age		0.007***
		(0.001)
Constant	0.418***	0.114**
	(0.040)	(0.058)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,088	2,088
R^2	.008	.119

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.2: List Position Regression Results - Median Candidate Skin Color

	Dependent variable:	
	Relative List Position	
	(1)	(2)
Median Candidate Skin Color	-4.509***	-4.104***
	(0.875)	(0.819)
Incumbent		44.531***
		(7.872)
College Degree		14.725***
		(2.055)
Woman Candidate		-0.502
		(1.854)
Candidate Age		0.854***
		(0.080)
Constant	66.840***	20.127***
	(3.396)	(5.100)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,088	2,088
R^2	.011	.115

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.3: List Position Regression Results - Party Indicator Values

	Dependent variable:	
	Relative List Position	
	(1)	(2)
Candidate Skin Color	-3.547***	-3.335***
	(0.697)	(0.664)
Incumbent		31.061***
		(6.259)
College Degree		11.427***
		(1.614)
Woman Candidate		-1.807
		(1.648)
Candidate Age		0.658***
		(0.064)
Left Party	1.026	1.468
	(2.203)	(2.100)
Center	0.694	1.166
	(2.264)	(2.161)
Constant	62.528***	27.224***
	(3.050)	(4.290)
Random Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,009	2,009
R^2	.013	.114

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.4: List Position Regression Results - Candidate Skin Color Indicator Variables

	Dependent variable:	
	Relative List Position	
	(1)	(2)
Candidate Skin Color (Round) =2	-13.145	-18.326*
	(10.117)	(9.407)
Candidate Skin Color (Round) =3	-17.050*	-20.473**
	(9.962)	(9.263)
Candidate Skin Color (Round) =4	-24.896**	-27.890***
	(9.986)	(9.282)
Candidate Skin Color (Round) =5	-31.860***	-36.182***
	(10.130)	(9.413)
Candidate Skin Color (Round) =6	-21.158*	-24.118**
	(11.484)	(10.670)
Candidate Skin Color (Round) =7	-31.258**	-33.349***
	(13.454)	(12.511)
Candidate Skin Color (Round) =8	-22.656	-23.860*
	(15.340)	(14.248)
Candidate Skin Color (Round) =9	-22.656	-23.860*
	(15.340)	(14.248)
Incumbent		45.302***
		(7.851)
College Degree		14.574***
		(2.055)
Woman Candidate		-0.695
		(1.855)
Candidate Age		0.871***
		(0.080)
Constant	71.881***	29.747***
	(9.775)	(9.755)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,088	2,088
R^2	.016	.123

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.5: List Position Regression Results - 6 Largest Political Parties

	CREO	Ecuadorian Union	Pachakutik	UNES	SUMA	Yes Democracy
Candidate Skin Color	-10.446***	-2.000	-0.466	1.738	-14.942***	-5.870*
	(3.142)	(4.023)	(4.431)	(3.097)	(3.826)	(2.962)
Incumbent	61.703***	0.000	14.321	27.258**	0.000	0.000
	(20.995)	(.)	(53.948)	(13.272)	(.)	(.)
College Degree	23.110***	8.812	13.002	40.940***	10.792	23.223***
	(8.046)	(8.727)	(10.292)	(8.532)	(8.497)	(7.987)
Woman Candidate	3.637	-6.011	-4.375	3.061	5.591	0.169
	(7.074)	(7.944)	(9.265)	(6.948)	(7.175)	(7.146)
Candidate Age	1.331***	0.850**	0.486	0.707*	1.393***	1.241***
	(0.313)	(0.339)	(0.407)	(0.359)	(0.335)	(0.303)
Constant	11.181	21.113	25.268	-17.893	41.551**	8.769
	(19.133)	(22.277)	(26.636)	(21.141)	(19.369)	(18.419)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	131	113	113	125	118	120
R^2	.287	.090	.037	.213	.216	.230

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E Skin Color-Gender Interaction Effects

In order to account for the possibility that the impact of candidate skin color on list position varies by candidate gender, we interact the *Candidate Skin Color* and *Woman Candidate* variables. In Table E.1 we report the results of Model 2 in Table 1 found in the manuscript with and without the interaction. When we include the interaction, the sign on the *Woman Candidate* variable flips and becomes positive and the *Candidate Skin Color*Woman Candidate* interaction has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. While this result suggests that dark-skinned men occupy higher, more advantageous list positions than dark-skinned women, additional diagnostic testing indicates that the result is fragile and model dependent.

Table E.1: List Position Regression Result

	Dependent variable:	
	Relative List Position	
	(1)	(2)
Candidate Skin Color	-4.744***	-3.535***
	(0.881)	(1.111)
Woman Candidate	-0.604	10.15
	(1.853)	(6.314)
Incumbent	44.85***	44.82***
	(7.863)	(7.858)
College Degree	14.68***	14.54***
	(2.052)	(2.053)
Candidate Age	0.857***	0.860***
	(0.0799)	(0.0799)
Candidate Skin Color $\times$ Woman Candidate		-2.903*
		(1.629)
Constant	22.38***	17.77***
	(5.220)	(5.822)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,088	2,088
R^2	.116	.118

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Following the recommendations proposed by Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2019), we plot the raw data in order to detect potential violations of the linear interaction effect assumption, which states that the effect of the key independent variable on the outcome of interest can only linearly change with the moderator variable at a constant rate given by β. Figure E.1 suggests this may not be the case as well as points to the possibility that there is not sufficient common support in the data.

Figure E.1: Linear Interaction Diagnostic Plots



Note: Figure E.1 shows the relationship between relative list position and candidate skin color by gender using the raw data.

In Figure E.2 we present marginal-effect estimates generated using a binning estimator. None of the three point estimates are significant, suggesting that the effect of gender on relative list position does not differ at typical low, medium, or high levels of candidate skin color as measured by the median values in the low, medium, and high terciles.

Figure E.2: Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Interval



Note: Figure E.2 show the estimated marginal-effects using both the conventional linear interaction model and the binning estimator.

In Figure E.3 we present marginal-effect estimates generated using a kernel estimator. While Figure E.3 suggests that there may be some linearity, the regions where significance is detected are also where data is most sparse. These results coupled with those presented above make us cautious about concluding that the impact of candidate skin color on relative list position varies by gender.

Figure E.3: Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Interval



Note: Figure E.3 show the estimated marginal-effects from the kernel estimator.

F Ecuadorian Ballot



Figure F.1: Example Ballot - National Level